Does social capital explain the Solow residual? A DSGE approach by Argentiero, Amedeo et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Does social capital explain the Solow
residual? A DSGE approach
Amedeo Argentiero and Roy Cerqueti and Fabio Sabatini
University of Perugia, University of Macerata, Sapienza University
of Rome
31 May 2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/87100/
MPRA Paper No. 87100, posted 31 May 2018 21:50 UTC
Does social capital explain the Solow residual? A
DSGE approach
Amedeo Argentiero ∗, Roy Cerqueti†, Fabio Sabatini ‡
May 31, 2018
Abstract
Social capital has been credited with playing a role in many desir-
able economic outcomes. We analyze how these potentially beneficial
effects translate into the macro-performance of economies by develop-
ing a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model featuring
the role of social capital in the explanation of the Solow residual. We
then simulate and estimate the model with Bayesian techniques using
Italian data. Our framework fits actual data better than a standard
DSGE model, suggesting that social capital may improve the economic
performance via its impact on total factor productivity.
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1 Introduction
The literature has credited social capital with playing a role in many desir-
able outcomes such as loan repayment and access to credit (Karlan et al.,
2009), investments in education (Coleman, 1988) and innovation (Knack and
Keefer, 1997), the efficiency of job matching processes (Granovetter, 1973),
the mitigation of agency problems in organizations (Costa and Kahn, 2003),
political accountability and the performance of institutions (Putnam et al.,
1993; Nannicini et al., 2013), just to name a few.
How do these effects translate into the macro-performance of economies?
Based on increasingly refined identification strategies, empirical studies found
evidence of a relationship between aspects of social capital - such as trust,
networks and forms of prosocial behavior - and growth across countries (e.g.
Knack and Keefer, 1997; Algan and Cahuc, 2010) or regions (e.g. Tabellini,
2010; Guiso et al., 2016). However, our knowledge of the mechanisms allow-
ing the effects of social capital to result in a better economic performance
and, in the long run, sustained growth is still limited.
In this paper we argue that social capital is a public good whose ac-
cumulation creates economy-wide externalities. This shared stock improves
the economic and institutional environment within which individuals acquire
their skills and firms accumulate means of production and produce output,
resulting in a more efficient allocation of resources and a higher total factor
productivity. Since trust enhances access to credit (Karlan, 2005; Feigen-
berg et al., 2013; Karlan et al., 2009), enrollment in higher education may
be easier; at the firm level, higher credit opportunities might simplify the
financing of innovative projects. The better performance and accountability
of public institutions generally linked to social capital raises the enforce-
ability of contracts (Rota et al., 2017) and the quality of public services,
including publicly provided education, thereby creating a less uncertain en-
vironment for investment decisions (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Hall and Jones,
1999). The mitigation of agency problems typical of a more trusting soci-
ety also plays a role in improving the management of human resources and
lowers monitoring costs both in the workplace and in inter-firm relationships
(La Porta et al., 1997; Costa and Kahn, 2003). Job placement mechanisms
are further refined by the fact that, in high trust societies, hiring decisions
are more likely to be influenced by talent and effort instead of the personal
attributes of applicants, such as blood ties and personal knowledge - which
are common surrogates of trustworthiness in low-trusting societies (Knack
and Keefer, 1997; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Zenou, 2015). As a result,
social capital also increases the return to specialized and vocational educa-
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tion, resulting in stronger incentives to invest in human capital (Knack and
Keefer, 1997; Guiso et al., 2010; Coppier et al., 2018).
Overall, these mechanisms create a social infrastructure more favorable
to high levels of output per worker, which, in the words of Hall and Jones
(1999): “Gets the prices right so that individuals capture the social returns
to their actions as private returns”.
We study the contribution of social capital to the economic performance
by developing a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model fea-
turing the role of social capital in a constant returns to scale production
function. We simulate and estimate the model using Bayesian techniques to
match Italian data for total factor productivity over the period 1950-2014.
Italy is a remarkable case study in the social capital literature for its well
known regional differences in terms of cultural traits, trust, and civic en-
gagement and because seminal studies have found evidence of a relationship
between aspects of social capital and the economic development of the coun-
try (e.g. Putnam et al., 1993; Guiso et al., 2004; Felice, 2012; Guiso et al.,
2016). We then compare the actual pattern of total factor productivity with
the same time series simulated through the DSGE model in a benchmark
case, i.e. not including social capital, and in our framework explicitly mod-
eling the role of social capital.
The empirical analysis shows that accounting for the role of social cap-
ital allows an otherwise standard DSGE model to better fit actual data in
the long run. This result suggests that the Solow residual may be credibly
explained by the macroeconomic effects of social capital.
Our paper bridges two strands of literature. The first broadly studies
the aggregate returns to social capital by empirically analyzing its corre-
lation with growth rates across countries (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Isishe
and Sawada, 2009; Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Anchorena and Anjos, 2015) or
regions (Akçomak and ter Weel, 2009; Tabellini, 2010; Guiso et al., 2016),
or with other macro outcomes, such as tax compliance (Andriani, 2016),
the performance of institutions (Nannicini et al., 2013), and the size of the
welfare state (Bjørnskov and Svendsen, 2013; Cerqueti et al., 2016).
The second strand encompasses macroeconomic studies investigating the
possible determinants, in addition to technology, of the Solow residual, such
as knowledge spillovers (Chang et al., 2016), entrepreneurial innovation (Gross-
man, 2009), sectoral composition (Casler and Gallatin, 1997), public health
(Kelly, 2017), and the depletion of natural resources (Antoci et al., 2009;
Antoci et al., 2011a).
We contribute to these strands of literature by developing, and empiri-
cally testing, the first DSGE model aimed at explaining the Solow residual as
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a result of social capital’s macroeconomic effects. Our findings suggest that
the relationship between social capital and growth highlighted in empirical
studies may be the result of a higher level of total factor productivity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
theoretical model. In Section 3 we describe our data, the methodology em-
ployed to estimate the parameters, the model’s dynamics through the im-
pulse response functions, and the related results. In section 4, we compare
the performance of the different model’s specifications through the measures
of entropy. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The economy is populated by infinitely living households, who maximize the
expected discounted value of an inter-temporal utility function, i.e.:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtUt (Ct, Nt) (1)
with βt corresponding to the subjective discount factor, Ct is private con-
sumption and Nt are the hours worked, under the following inter-temporal
budget constraint:
PtCt +K
p
t +K
s
t ≤ RptKpt−1 +RstKst−1 +WtNt (2)
where Kpt−1 and K
s
t−1 are the endowments of physical and social capital
respectively at the beginning of time t , Pt is the consumer price index, Wt
are nominal wages, and Rit (i = s, p) are the gross rates of return
Rit = r
i
t + 1− δi (3)
with rit (i = s, p) representing the net capital rentals and δi (i = s, p) the
capital depreciation rates.
According to the seminal work of Becker (1974) and Bourdieu (1986),
social capital is in part accumulated through rational investment decisions.
Agents, in fact, also invest in the creation of connections and social obli-
gations, and in building a reputation of trustworthiness, to the purpose of
pursuing particular or general goals that could not be achieved without co-
ordination and cooperation. The stock resulting from these decisions is a
shared resource having the nature of a public good (Bourdieu (1986); Put-
nam et al., 1993; Dasgupta, 2001). In line with the extensive literature on
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social capital and growth (see for example Knack and Keefer, 1997, and An-
toci et al., 2011b), we assume this resource being an input of production.
As suggested by Bourdieu (1986), agents can appropriate the outcomes of
production to the extent of their personal or corporate wealth of social cap-
ital, which therefore determines the rental rate of this factor of production.
In the words of Bourdieu, “The profits which derive from membership in a
group are the basis of the solidarity which makes them possible” (Bourdieu,
1986, 250). Social capital, however, requires an endless and costly effort to
produce and reproduce lasting relationships (Bourdieu, 1982; 1986). Like
the other forms of capital, it is therefore subject to depreciation, as relation-
ships, networks and trust can slacken over time as a result of the decline in
social participation and of negative shocks (see for example Antoci et al.,
2011b; Bilancini and D’Alessandro, 2012; Guriev and Melnikov, 2016).
Both physical and social capital, Kit (i = s, p), evolve according to the
standard law of motion, i.e.:
Kit −Kit−1 = Iit − δiKit−1 (4)
where Iit (i = s, p) are investments in social capital, achieved through
social participation. The more actors engage socially and civically, the
stronger, wider and more trust-intensive are the networks they create or
belong to (Bourdieu, 1986).
Following Antoci et al. (2011b), we can think of Ist as the average level
social participation. A higher social participation, in fact, provides individ-
ual and corporate actors with higher opportunities of creating new, trust-
intensive, ties, and makes it easier to preserve the existing ones. If, by
contrast, the social environment is poor of participation opportunities, the
creation or new ties and the activation of existing, latent, relationships, re-
quire more time and effort, to the point that agents may have the incentive
to replace social participation (e.g. civic engagement and the consumption
of relational goods) with physical activities (Antoci et al., 2011b; 2015).
Private consumption Ct is defined as follows
Ct =
[ˆ 1
0
Ct (j)
1− 1
ε di
] ε
ε−1
(5)
with j representing the variety of goods produced by each firm acting as a
monopolistic competitor, Ct (j) is the consumption of the good j  [0; 1] and
ε > 1 indicating the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods.
The optimal allocation of expenditures across the households reads as
Ct (i) =
(
Pt (j)
Pt
)−ε
Ct (6)
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with Pt (j) representing the price of the good j implying that
ˆ 1
0
Pt (j)Ct (j) dj = PtCt (7)
and
Pt =
[ˆ 1
0
Pt (j)
1−ε dj
] 1
1−ε
(8)
We assume that the period utility function follows a semi-logarithmic
form:
U (Ct, Nt) = log (Ct)− N
1+γ
t
1 + γ
(9)
where γ is the inverse of the Frish elasticity of labor supply.
The supply side of the economy is composed of a representative per-
fectly competitive final goods firm whose intermediate inputs are aggregated
according to the following CES technology
Yt =
(ˆ 1
0
Yt (j)
−1

) 
−1
(10)
where j  [0; 1] is a continuum of firms, each one producing a different variety
of intermediate good with the same constant returns to scale technology:
Yt (j) = At [Nt (j)]
ζ [Kpt−1 (j)]ν [Kst−1 (j)]1−ζ−ν (11)
where Yt (j) is the production function of good j, Nt (j), K
p
t−1 (j) and
Kst−1 (j) are labor, physical and social capital employed in the productive
process of good j, whereas At is a productivity shifter whose law of motion
in logs reads as
at = ρat−1 + at (12)
where at = logAt, ρ [0, 1] is a persistence coefficient and at is a white
noise.
Moreover, each firm has a probability of resetting prices in any given
period, 1−θ, independent across firms (staggered price setting, Calvo, 1983),
with θ  [0; 1], indicating an index of price stickiness.
The aggregate price dynamics reads as
Pt =
[
θ (Pt−1)1−ε + (1− θ) (P ∗t )1−ε
] 1
1−ε (13)
with P ∗t indicating the prices resetted in period t; inflation is positively
related to the discounted expected value of the inflation of one period ahead
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and to the log-deviation of real marginal cost according to the degree of price
stickiness captured by the parameter1 θ :
pit = βpi
e
t+1 +
(1− θ) (1− βθ)
θ
m̂ct (14)
The level of output associated to a fully-flexible price scenario is y¯t with the
following corresponding log-linear definition of output gap
y˜t = yt − y¯t (15)
The market clearing conditions for the good j can be expressed as follows:
Yt(j) = Ct(j) (16)
The previous relationship states that production of good j is allocated to
private consumption.
Then, using the definitions of Ct(j), equation (16) can be rewritten as
follows:
Yt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−ε
Ct (17)
Finally, by plugging (17) into the definition of the aggregate output (10)
the aggregate market clearing condition is obtained:
Yt = Ct (18)
In the case of absence of social capital (i.e. the benchmark case compared
to a scenario where social capital is present, in order to evaluate which of the
two models better matches the time series of Solow residual), the previous
1This expression is analytically derived in Appendix.
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model collapses to the following equations:
U (Ct, Nt) = log (Ct)− N
1+γ
t
1 + γ
(19)
PtCt +K
p
t ≤ RptKpt−1 +WtNtˆ 1
0
Pt (j)Ct (j) dj = PtCt
Yt (j) = At [Nt (j)]
ζ [Kpt−1 (j)]1−ζ
at = ρat−1 + at
Yt =
(ˆ 1
0
Yt (j)
−1

) 
−1
pit = βpi
e
t+1 +
(1− θ) (1− βθ)
θ
m̂ct
Yt = Ct
3 Methodology, data and model dynamics
We empirically test the model using Italian annual data. Since the seminal
study of Putnam et al. (1993), Italy is a typical case study in the social capital
literature, due to its remarkable regional differences. Several studies have
provided evidence of the role of social capital in the economic development
of Italy (e.g. Felice, 2012; Guiso et al., 2004; Guiso et al., 2016).
In order to estimate the parameters, simulate the time series and evalu-
ate their dynamic responses in the presence of the total factor productivity
shock, we adopt the inferential procedure based on the Monte Carlo Markow
Chains (MCMC) methods and, in particular, on the Metropolis-Hastings al-
gorithm, which belongs to the family of Bayesian estimation methods (see
among others Canova, 2007 and Smets and Wouters, 2007). In particular,
we have built a multi-chain MCMC procedure based on four chains of size
100,000. The algorithm converges within 45,000 iterations to its expected
value. Therefore, to remove any dependence from the initial conditions, we
remove the first 45,000 observations from each chain. This high number of
iterations, together with the 90% highest posterior density (HPD) credible
interval for the estimates, ensures the robustness of our results2. All the
calculations have been performed through the software DYNARE.
2In detail, the estimation procedure is based on two steps. In the first, we have es-
timated the mode of the posterior distribution by maximizing the log posterior density
function, which is a combination of the prior information on the structural parameters
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Below, we summarize the measurement equation considered, i.e. the
relationship between the data (left side) and the model variables (right side):
[∆ lnYt] = [Υ] + 100 ∗ [yt − yt−1] (20)
where ∆ lnYt is the real GDP annual growth rate for Italy expressed in
percentage terms from 1950 to 2014 drawn from Fred Economic Data, and
Υ = 100 ∗ ln (υ) is the annual real GDP trend growth rate, expressed in
percentage terms.
We choose the real GDP growth rate as the observable variable due to
its important informative role: in fact, real GDP growth encompasses both
Solow residual and the contribution to growth linked to the productive fac-
tors.
The parameters and their definitions are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Definitions of the parameters
Parameters Definitions
ζ
ν
δp
δs
γ
β
θ
Υ
ρ
σ
output elasticity of labor
output elasticity of private capital
depreciation rate of private capital
depreciation rate of social capital
Frish elasticity of labor supply
Inter-temporal discount factor
Price stickiness
Annual real GDP growth rate
Persistence of total factor productivity
Standard deviation of total factor productivity shock
The prior densities are consistent with the domain of the parameters.
Following Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008), in the prior elicitation process
we divided the parameters into three groups, on the basis of the information
used to calibrate the priors.
The first group of parameters consists of those that determine the steady
state [ζ, ν, δp, δs] and whose calibration derives from macroeconomic ‘great
with the likelihood of the data. In the second, we have used the Metropolis-Hastings algo-
rithm in order to draw a complete picture of the posterior distribution and compute the
log marginal likelihood of the model. Moreover, following Brooks and Gelman (1998), we
carried out the univariate convergence diagnostic based on a comparison between pooled
and within MCMC moments, whose results are available upon request.
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ratios’ mainly referred to the sample information. In the second group there
are parameters that are related to policy, households, production [γ, β, θ,Υ],
taken either from micro-level data or from the literature or from out-of-the-
sample information. In the third group there are parameters describing the
propagation mechanism of the stochastic shocks, such as standard deviations
of them and autocorrelations [ρ, σ]. These last parameters are calibrated on
the basis of the second moments of the observable variables, which are also
consistent with the results found by the literature.
The calibrated values compared with the posterior ones are shown in
Table 2.
The posterior values of the parameters are estimated using the observable
variable (the real GDP annual growth rate) conditionally to the model. The
posterior estimates of the parameters are composed of the posterior means
together with the 90% HPD (Highest Posterior Density) credible interval for
the estimated parameters obtained by the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm3.
Table 2: Prior and posterior distributions of the parameters
Parameters Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Distribution Mean St. Dev. Mean 90% HPD interval
ζ
ν
δp
δs
γ
β
θ
Υ
ρ
σ
beta 0.40 0.10
beta 0.30 0.10
beta 0.10 0.10
beta 0.09 0.10
gamma 3.00 0.75
beta 0.80 0.1
beta 0.75 0.1
normal 1.55 0.1
beta 0.90 0.10
inv. gamma 0.10 2.00
0.60 0.45 0.73
0.32 0.15 0.50
0.16 0.00 0.38
0.14 0.00 0.38
2.55 1.32 3.67
0.78 0.63 0.93
0.95 0.92 0.98
1.53 1.36 1.68
0.98 0.95 1.00
0.04 0.02 0.06
The elasticities of the production function (ζ, ν) have been calibrated
considering the average share of wages and capital rentals on GDP for Italy
from 1980 to 2011 (provided by the Italian National Institute of Statistics,
Istat) with a small standard deviation; the posterior value of labor share is
higher than the prior one, showing the relative importance of labor input
3We have increased the standard deviations of the prior distributions of the parameters
by 50 percent in order to evaluate the sensitivity of the estimation results with the as-
sumptions on prior estimates (Smets and Wouters, 2007). Overall, the estimation results
are quite the same (results are available upon request).
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in the Italian production function, whereas the posterior estimate of phys-
ical capital is almost the same than the calibrated value. The prior value
of the depreciation rates for physical and social capital has been measured
through the steady state ratio
(
δ = I¯
i
K¯i
)
(i = s, p): for physical capital we
have used Italian data on investments and capital stocks from 1980 to 2011.
To measure social capital we followed an established approach (see for exam-
ple Guiso et al., 2004; Nannicini et al., 2013; Guriev and Melnikov, 2016) and
relied on an indicator of the volume of blood donations as given by the num-
ber of 16-ounce blood bags collected per inhabitant provided by the Italian
Association of Voluntary Blood Donors (AVIS), which collects 90 percent of
the whole blood donations and 100 percent of anonymous blood donations.
In particular, the parameter δs has been calibrated by considering the yearly
blood donations from 1980 to 2011 as a measure of Ist , i.e. the average level
social participation, and the accumulation over time of them as an indicator
of social capital stock. The posterior values of δi are both higher than prior
ones.
The prior value for the inverse of Frish elasticity of labor supply (γ) is able
to match four empirical moments for the Italian data from 1980 to 2011 in
accordance with Cho and Cooley (1994) and Argentiero and Bollino (2015):
the ratio of standard deviation of total output to the standard deviation of
total consumption, the correlation between total output and total consump-
tion, the correlation between underground production and total consumption
and the correlation between regular production and total consumption. The
posterior value for γ is slightly lower than the prior one. The annual real
GDP trend growth rate (Γ) is normally distributed, has been calibrated on
Italian data with a prior mean of 1.55 that is almost the same of the posterior
estimated value.
The price stickiness coefficient, i.e. the fraction of firms that does not
reset its price in a period, is calibrated to a value of 0.75, following Galì
and Monacelli (2008). The posterior value of this parameter is higher than
the prior one, thus showing a higher degree of price stickiness for the Italian
economy.
Following the real business cycle literature (see for example King and Re-
belo, 1999) and the second moments of Italian total factor productivity data
(provided by FRED Economic Data), we set a high value for the persistence
coefficient of total factor productivity, which has also been confirmed by the
estimation procedure, and a loose prior value for the standard deviation of
the productivity shifter (σ) .
The dynamic response of the main variables, in log-deviations from their
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Figure 1: Impulse response functions for a positive productivity shock
steady state values, to stochastic shocks to total factor productivity is rep-
resented by impulse response functions (IRFs) in figure 1. Note that for all
of the IRFs, the size of the standard deviations of the stochastic shocks and
the variables’ responses relate to the posterior average of the IRFs for each
draw of the MCMC algorithm, together with 90% credible intervals.
In the aftermath of a positive technology shock, output increases, but
less than the positive growth of total factor productivity. This stylized fact
is consistent with the empirical findings of Galì (1999), Smets and Wouters
(2003) and Galì and Monacelli (2008) according to which price stickiness de-
termines an increase of aggregate demand (increase in private consumption)
lower than the rise in supply. Hence, firms, due to the increased productiv-
ity, are able to produce the same quantity of goods with less hours worked,
although capital stocks and investments increase due to the rise of capi-
tal rentals. Real marginal costs (mc) fall as well as inflation, but this last
variable decrease less than in a fully flexible price scenario.
4 Analysis of the performance
In this section, we compare the empirical annual time series of Italian total
factor productivity from 1950 to 2014 with the series obtained by imple-
menting the DSGE model in the benchmark case (19) of absence of social
capital (benchmark series, BS hereafter) and in presence of social capital
(social capital series, SC hereafter). In doing so, we want to understand if
adding social capital to the productivity function allows the model to better
fit actual data.
A MCMC method has been used to generate the simulated time series
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for the BS and SC models. The simulated series span the same period
of the original sample with the same periodicity, to allow the comparison
experiments. Thus, we have 65 years for the period 1950-2014. We consider
100,000 realizations of the random shocks described in the considered DSGE
models (see section 2). Next, the expected value of all the simulations at
each time has been taken, and this will be the corresponding values at each
year. Therefore, the length of the original sample and of the two simulated
series will be n = 65.
We denote by x = (xi)i=1,...,n, b = (bi)i=1,...,n and s = (si)i=1,...,n the
original sample, the series of type BS and SC, respectively.
To discuss the models, three strategies have been adopted. First, the
distance between x and b has been compared with the one between x and s.
The times of the realizations will be included in this part of the analysis, so
that the concept of distance between two series will involve the contempora-
neous realizations of the series. As we will see, several concepts of distance
have been used, in order to obtain a satisfactory level of information from
this procedure. Second, we adopt a data science perspective and discuss a
rank-size analysis of the three series. In so doing, we are able to understand
the possible presence of common regularities of the realizations of the three
series when they are ranked in descending order. As a side analysis of data
science type, the linear trends of the series have been also compared. Third,
the empirical distributions of the three series have been considered and com-
pared under the point of view of the descriptive statistics. In this framework,
an entropy between the series distributions has been also taken into account.
4.1 Time series distance approach
The distances employed in the first approach are the Euclidean one, the max-
imum, the minimum and the Euclidean one. They are defined, respectively,
as follows
dM (x, y) = max
i=1,...,n
|xi − yi|, (21)
dm(x, y) = max
i=1,...,n
|xi − yi|, (22)
dE(x, y) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(xi − yi)2, (23)
where y ∈ {b, s}. The three concepts of distance are quite natural and jointly
offer a panoramic view on how the original sample is close to the benchmark
simulations or to the ones with social capital in a time-wise form.
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Distance d d(x, s) d(x, b)
d = dM 0,524 1,814
d = dm 0 0
d = dE 0,038 0,445
Table 3: Distances between the original sample x and the two competing
simulated series b and s, according to formulas in (21), (22) and (23).
Results can be found in Table 3.
By looking at Table 3, it is clear that the model with social capital has a
remarkably smaller distance to the empirical sample than the model without
social capital. The average (Euclidean) distance dE(x, b) is more than eleven
times greater than dE(x, s), while the maximum distance is more than three
times bigger.
4.2 Data science approach
Time series are here viewed as collections of numbers. We aim at understand-
ing whenever b and s share some regularity properties with x, and which one
is closer to x in this respect.
The first step of this analysis is the assessment and the discussion of the
linear trend of the three series. Time plays a relevant role, in that trend is
intended on a temporal basis and allows to observe the overall behavior of
the time series. To achieve our scopes, a simple linear regression has been
implemented over the three series, according to equation
y = αt+ β, (24)
with y ∈ {x, b, s} and t > 0 represents time. α and β are the parameters to
be calibrated, and represent the slope and the intercept, respectively.
Results can be find in Figures 2, 3, 4 and Table 4.
Some insights can be derived from the linear trend exploration. First of
all, it is rather evident that one can hardly observe a reliable linear trend for
b, while x and s exhibit a better looking linear regression. This is confirmed
also by the values of R2, which are reported in Table 4. Notice also that the
R2 for the empirical case is around 60% and similar to that of SC, hence
suggesting an analogous explanation power of the linear regression of the
scatter plot. Moreover, both linear trends for x and s show an increasing
behavior.
In the second step, a rank-size analysis approach has been adopted. The
elements of the series have been ranked in decreasing order, so that rank = 1
14
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Figure 2: Linear trend for x. For a better visualization, the scatter plot is
also presented.
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Figure 3: Linear trend for the benchmark series b. The scatter plot is jux-
taposed to the best fit straight line.
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Figure 4: Linear trend for s. Also in this case, the scatter plot and the
calibrated linear function are jointly shown.
Series y αˆ βˆ R2
y = x 0.008415 (0.006849, 0.00998) 0.6549 (0.5954, 0.7143) 0.6468
y = b 0.0049 (-0.002205, 0.01201) 0.5171 (0.2474, 0.7869) 0.0293
y = s 0.01441 (0.01157, 0.01726) 0.3493 (0.2412, 0.4575) 0.6188
Table 4: The calibrated parameters αˆ and βˆ of the linear regression exer-
cise, according to formula (24), for the three cases of original sample, the
benchmark series and the one with social capital. In brackets, the confidence
interval at a 95% confidence level.
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Figure 5: Rank-size best fit for x, according to formula (25), along with the
scatter plot of the real data.
is associated to the largest value of the series while rank = n is the smallest
one. In so doing, the temporal dimension of the considered series is lost. The
scatter plot of the series realizations with respect to rank is then fitted with
a decreasing curve y = f(rank) belonging to a preselected parametric family
of functions. The comparison of the calibrated parameters obtained for x,
b and s say much about the similarities of BS and SC with the empirical
sample.
By a preliminary visual inspection of the rank-size scatter plot, we here
consider a third degree polynomia of the type
f(rank) = γ3 · rank3 + γ2 · rank2 + γ1 · rank + γ0 (25)
where γ0, γ1, γ2, γ3 are real parameters to be calibrated.
Figures 5, 6 and 7 allows a visual inspection of the best fit, which is
rather satisfactory for the three cases. Such an idea is confirmed by looking
at the goodness of fit R2, which is reported for completeness along with the
calibrated parameters in Table ??.
Rank-size analysis provides some information about the closeness of b
and s to x. Figures 5, 6 and 7 highlight that x and s show a similar shape
in terms of concavity of the best fitted curve, hence suggesting a common
behavior of the elements of the original series and the SC one when they are
ranked in descending order. Differently with such series, the curve associated
to BS is convex at high rank and exhibits an inflection point at a middle rank.
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Figure 6: Rank-size best fit for b through function in (25) and related scatter
plot.
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Figure 7: Rank-size best fit for s, obtained by using formula (25). The
scatter plot is also shown for comparison purposes.
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Table 6: Main statistical indicators associated to the three series x, b and s.
Statistical indicator x s b
Mean µ 0,93 0,83 0,68
Variance σ2 0,04 0,12 0,29
Standard deviation σ 0,20 0,35 0,54
Skewness -1,01 -1,09 1,18
Kurtosis -0,55 -0,09 2,07
Median 1,03 0,96 0,58
Max 1,13 1,34 2,78
Min 0,51 0,01 0,01
4.3 Empirical distribution approach
Time series are here discussed on the basis of their empirical distributions. As
in the case of rank-size analysis, the time dimension is lost but a meaningful
analysis of the macroscopic properties of the realizations can be carried out.
The main descriptive statistics are presented in Table 6.
By looking at Table 6, one can immediately argue that the series with
social capital is much closer to the empirical sample than the series without
social capital. Remarkably, skewness is negative and with very similar values
for x and s while it is positive with a large value for b, hence leading to an
evident violation of the symmetry property of the distributions when social
capital does not intervene in the DSGE model. Analogously, kurtosis is
negative for x and s and it is positive with a value close to three for b.
This means that we are in presence of an original sample of platykurtic type
– confirmed also for the series with the addition of social capital – while
the case without social capital leads to a leptokurtic distribution. Values of
x and s are much closer to the mean than the one of b (smaller standard
deviations) and the distance between the means is lower for x and s than for
x and b. Moreover, x and s seem to span analogous intervals (quite the same
maxima and minima) while the maximum between x and b are noticeably
different.
The distance between the distribution of x and those of b and s has
been also measured by using entropy. Such a measure is suitable for our
scopes, because it is is able to capture the overall features of the distribution
of the data under investigation. In this respect, entropy summarize in a
unified setting the position and variability indicators given by the descriptive
statistics.
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Table 7: Computation of the entropy for the three series x, b and s, according
to formula (26).
x s b
Entropy 4,15 4,06 3,87
The considered entropy is given by:
E(y) = −
n∑
i=1
|yi|∑n
k=1 |yk|
· log
( |yi|∑n
k=1 |yk|
)
, (26)
where y = [yi]i=1,...,n. We use formula (26) for the original sample y = x
and when y = b and y = s. The reference entropy is the one associated to
the original sample x. The model – BS or SC – which fits the empirical data
in a more convincing way is the one whose entropy is closer to the one of x.
The reasoning behind this evidence lies in the thermodynamic definition of
entropy, which is nothing but the disorder associated to the series. Basically,
the value of the entropy can be associated to the distance of the distribution
from the uniform case. This suggests that similar entropies are associated to
analogous macroscopic properties of the probabilistic structure of the data,
hence leading to similar series.
Results are reported in Table 7.
The comparison between the entropies gives that both the simulated
series underestimate the reference entropy of the original sample x. However,
the entropy of s is much closer to the reference one than the entropy of b.
This outcome goes in the same direction of what said by the analysis of the
descriptive statistics, hence stating the supremacy of the DSGE model with
social capital in capturing the real data with respect to the benchmark model
without social capital.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we developed a DSGE model to analyze the possible contri-
bution of social capital in explaining the Solow residual. Our model fits
the actual pattern of total factor productivity in Italy from 1950 to 2014
better than a standard DSGE model not featuring the role of social capi-
tal, suggesting that the latter can actually explain total factor productivity.
This result supports the empirical approaches finding a positive relationship
between social capital and the economic performance across countries.
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However, our estimated model remains stylized and cannot shed light
on the mechanisms through which social capital may increase productivity.
Based on previous literature, we suggest the improvement in the efficiency
of the credit and the labor market, the higher incentives to invest in human
capital and innovation, and the mitigation of agency problems as possible
channels of transmission. However, further research is needed for a deeper
understanding of the action of social capital and for disentangling the effect of
its several dimensions (e.g. networks and trust). In addition, a refinement in
measurement methods and an extension of the analysis to other case studies
is certainly desirable.
Having said that, our work provides the first attempt to explain pro-
ductivity dynamics through a DSGE framework featuring the role of social
capital, thus providing a new possible interpretation of the Solow residual
that contributes to a vast literature at the intersection between social capital
and productivity studies.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Equilibrium Characterization
6.1.1 Households
The (9) is maximized under (2) by using the method of Lagrange multipliers4,
i.e.:
L = max
[Ct,Nt,Kpt ,Kst ]
∞
t=0
E
 ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
log (Ct)− N
1+γ
t
1+γ
)
+
+χt
(
RptK
p
t−1 +R
s
tK
s
t−1 +WtNt − PtCt −Kpt −Kst
)

(27)
where χt is the dynamic Lagrange multiplier, with the following three
necessary conditions:
∂L
∂Ct
:
1
(Ct)Pt
= χt (28)
∂L
∂Nt
:
Nγt
Wt
= χt (29)
∂L
∂Kpt
: −χt + βEt [χt+1Rpt ] = 0 (30)
∂L
∂Kst
: −χt + βEt [χt+1Rst ] = 0 (31)
where (30) and (31)state that in equilibrium the value of marginal utility of
consumption at time t is equal to the discounted expected value of marginal
utility of consumption at time t+ 1.
The following equation is a result of the combination of (28) and (29),
i.e.:
Nγt (Ct) =
Wt
Pt
(32)
The combination of (28) with (30) and (31) reads as:
βRptEt
[(
Ct
Ct+1
)(
Pt
Pt+1
)]
= 1 (33)
βRstEt
[(
Ct
Ct+1
)(
Pt
Pt+1
)]
= 1 (34)
The previous equations imply the following non arbitrage condition be-
tween the gross rates of return
Rpt = R
s
t (35)
4The use of dynamic programming technique would produce the same results.
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that in steady state reads as
R
p
t = R
s
t =
1
β
(36)
6.1.2 Firms
The profit maximization problem of the final good firm is:
max
Yt(j)
Pt
(ˆ 1
0
Yt (j)
ε−1
ε
) ε
ε−1
−
ˆ 1
0
Pt (j)Yt (j) dj (37)
with the following FOC for the variety of intermediate good j:
Pt
ε
ε− 1
(ˆ 1
0
Yt (i)
ε−1
ε
) ε
ε−1−1 ε− 1
ε
Yt (i)
ε
ε−1−1 = Pt (i) (38)(ˆ 1
0
Yt (i)
ε−1
ε
)− ε
ε−1
Yt (i) =
(
Pt (i)
Pt
)−ε
(39)
from which is derived the corresponding relative demand for the good j
Yt (i) =
(
Pt (i)
Pt
)−ε
Yt (40)
Given (Wt, R
p
t , R
s
t )
∞
t=0, since the representative intermediate producers
face a common price for the productive factors, each firm faces the following
problem:
min
[Nt(j),Kpt−1(j),Kst−1(j)]
∞
t=0
− (WtNt (j) +RptKpt−1 (j) +RstKst−1 (j))+ (41)
+ ϕ (j)
 At [Nt (j)]
ζ [Kpt−1 (j)]ν [Kst−1 (j)]1−ζ−ν +
+ (1− δp)Kpt−1 (j) +
+ (1− δs)Kst−1 (j)−
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
Yt
 (42)
where the Lagrange multiplier ϕ (j) is associated to the marginal costs.
The problem (41) yields to the following FOCs:
Wt = ϕ (j)
[
ζAt [Nt (j)]
ζ−1 [Kpt−1 (j)]ν [Kst−1 (j)]1−ζ−ν] (43)
Rpt = ϕ (j)
[
νAt [Nt (j)]
ζ−1 [Kpt−1 (j)]ν−1 [Kst−1 (j)]1−ζ−ν + (1− δp)] (44)
Rst = ϕ (j)
[
(1− ζ − ν)At [Nt (j)]ζ−1
[
Kpt−1 (j)
]ν−1 ∗
∗ [Kst−1 (j)]−ζ−ν + (1− δs)
]
(45)
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from which an expression for the marginal costs MCt can be derived
MCt = ζ
−ζν−ν (1− ζ − ν)−(1−ζ−ν) (Wt)ζ (Rpt )ν (Rst )1−ζ−ν
1
At
(46)
From the expression of the aggregate price dynamics (13)
Pt =
[
θ (Pt−1)1−ε + (1− θ) (P ∗t )1−ε
] 1
1−ε (47)
the division of each member of (47) by Pt−1 reads as
Π1−εt = θ + (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt−1
)1−ε
(48)
The log-linearization of (48) around zero inflation steady state produces
the following equivalent results
pit = (1− θ) (p∗t − pt−1) (49)
pt = θpt−1 + (1− θ) p∗t (50)
A firm in period t chooses a price P ∗t that maximizes the current market
value of the profits Υt, i.e.
max
P ∗t
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
{
Qt,t+k
(
P ∗t Yt+k|t −Ψt+k
(
Yt+k|t
))}
(51)
subject to the sequence of demand constraints
Yt+k|t =
(
P ∗t
Pt+k
)−ε
Ct+k (52)
for k = 0, 1, 2, ... and where Qt,t+k = βk (Ct+k/Ct) (Pt/Pt+k) is the dis-
count factor, Ψt (·) is the cost function of the firm, whereas Yt+k|t represents
output in period t + k for a firm resetting its price in period t. Next, the
first order condition associated with the problem (51) is given by:
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
{
Qt,t+kYt+k|t
(
P ∗t −Mψt+k|t
)}
= 0 (53)
where ψt+k|t = Ψ
′
t+k
(
Yt+k|t
)
indicates the nominal marginal cost in pe-
riod t + k for a firm resetting its price in period t and M = εε−1 that is
the desired markup in the absence of constraints on the frequency of price
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adjustment. Note that in the absence of price rigidities (θ = 0) the previ-
ous condition collapses to the optimal price setting condition under flexible
prices:
P ∗t = Mψt|t (54)
Then, the division of both the members of (53) by P it−1 reads as:
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
{
Qt,t+kYt+k|t
(
P ∗t
Pt−1
−M ∗MCt+k|tΠt−1,t+k
)}
= 0 (55)
where MCt+k|t =
ψt+k|t
Pt+k
is the real marginal cost in period t + k for firms
whose last price set is in period t.
Finally, the log-linearization of (55) around the zero inflation steady state
with a first-order Taylor expansion reads as
p∗t − pt−1 = (1− βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k Et
[
m̂ct+k|t + (pt+k − pt−1)
]
(56)
where m̂ct+k|t = mct+k|t −mc is the log-deviation of marginal cost from its
steady state value.
The optimal price setting strategy for the typical firm resetting its price
in period t can be derived from (56), after some algebra:
p∗t = µ+ (1− βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k Et
[
mct+k|t + pt+k
]
(57)
with µ = log εε−1 representing the optimal markup in the absence of
constraints on the frequency of price adjustment (θ = 0) .
Hence, the price setting rule for the firms resetting their prices is repre-
sented by a charge over the optimal markup in the presence of fully flexible
prices, given by a weighted average of their current and expected nominal
marginal costs, with the weights being proportional to the probability of the
price remaining effective (θ)k.
Note that, under the hypothesis of constant returns to scale, implicit in
the production function of our model, the marginal cost is independent from
the level of production, i.e. mct+k|t = mct+k and, hence, common across
firms; so, the expression (57) can be rewritten in the following way:
p∗t − pt−1 = (1− βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k Et [mct+k] +
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k Et [pt+k] (58)
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Moreover, the equation (58) can be expressed in the following recursive
form:
p∗t − pt−1 = βθEt
[
p∗t+1
]− (1− βθ) pt + (1− βθ) m̂ct (59)
and combined with (49) in a log-linear form in order to obtain the do-
mestic inflation equation:
pit = βpi
e
t+1 +
(1− θ) (1− βθ)
θ
m̂ct (60)
with piet+1 = Et [pit+1] .
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